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Expansion of the Reporting System Paradigm 
to the United States Maritime Industry
by Jeffrey A. Bixler
This	paper	focuses	on	the	creation	of	a	U.S.	maritime	reporting	system	designed	to	alert	the	industry	
of	safety	incidents	and	prevent	accidents.	A	brief	history	of	aviation	safety	reporting	will	be	provided,	
followed	by	an	analysis	of	eight	recent	U.S.	maritime	accidents	that	reveal	a	gap	in	maritime	safety	
information	sharing.	This	paper	will	also	describe	the	United	Kingdom’s	maritime	reporting	system	
and	the	previous	work	completed	on	a	U.S.	maritime	reporting	system.	This	paper	concludes	with	
the	impact	of	terrorism	on	maritime	security	and	how	previous	work	in	aviation	security	reporting	
could	be	incorporated	into	a	maritime	reporting	system.	
INTRODUCTION
The United States has remained an aviation leader since the Wright Brothers’ humble beginnings in 
1903. However, the same is not true for the U.S. maritime industry. The industrial prosperity that 
followed World War II did not include the commercial maritime community, and although U.S. 
Naval Forces maintained supremacy, the nation’s merchant marine fleet declined. The disparity 
between aviation and maritime transportation modes is also reflected in the area of safety. While the 
United States is a world leader in techniques and tools to improve aviation safety, it has not adapted 
these capabilities to the maritime industry. 
This paper focuses on the need to create a U.S. maritime reporting system designed to alert the 
industry to safety incidents, the precursors to accidents. This paper will provide a brief history of 
aviation safety reporting, followed by an analysis of eight U.S. maritime accidents that demonstrate 
the need for a reporting system that can identify maritime hazards and prevent similar accidents. 
This paper will also describe the United Kingdom’s maritime reporting system and the previous 
work completed in developing a prototype U.S. maritime reporting system. This paper concludes 
with the effects of the 2001 terrorist attacks on maritime security and how previous work in aviation 
security reporting could be applied to a maritime reporting system.
HISTORY OF U.S. AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING
To best apply the proven techniques and concepts of aviation safety to the maritime industry, it 
is important to understand the history of aviation safety reporting. In aviation, technological 
improvements reduced the accident rate by reducing mechanical failure. As a result, human error 
has become the leading cause of aviation accidents, and prevention methods focus their attention 
on near-miss incidents to better understand and reduce human error. The aviation reporting program 
that has served as a model for other systems arose from a National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) recommendation made in a 1974 airline accident investigation. The NTSB found that while 
one airline was aware of a significant safety hazard and distributed a company-wide alert concerning 
the near-miss incident, no system existed to share information throughout the industry. Less than 
two months after the first airline experienced the near-miss incident, a second airline experienced 
the same event and a fatal accident occurred. Consequently, a joint program by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), called the 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), was created to fill this information gap. Since 1976, it has 
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been providing human factors researchers with valuable aviation incident (near-miss) information 
(NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System 2008a).
An equally positive outcome of ASRS has been the expansion of reporting programs and 
concepts to include additional disciplines and domains. During an interview with the NASA 
ASRS Director, Linda Connell, on December 10, 2008, Ms. Connell stated that other professional 
fields such as medicine, security and emergency response, along with highway, rail and maritime 
transportation modes, had consulted NASA about developing reporting systems. While the shift 
from mechanical error to human error accidents has also occurred in the maritime industry, there 
is currently no U.S. Government directed program to collect individual reporter information and 
disseminate it to the maritime industry.
RECENT U.S. MARITIME ACCIDENTS
A review of U.S. maritime accidents reveals an information sharing gap, further revealing that a 
maritime safety reporting system would help to prevent repeat accidents. The NTSB investigated 
all eight of the U.S. maritime accidents described in this paper, with seven of them occurring in the 
previous six years. The first four accidents describe two very common types of marine accidents 
involving shipboard fires and stability problems. The goal of any safety reporting system is to learn 
from near-miss incidents in order to prevent similar accidents.
Engine Fire on Small Passenger Vessel Express Shuttle II
A shipboard fire occurred in 2004 on board the Express	Shuttle	II, a small passenger vessel operating 
on the Pithlachascotee River near Port Richey, Florida. The vessel was being used to transport 78 
passengers to an offshore casino boat in the Gulf of Mexico, but only three crew members were 
on board when the fire occurred. None of the crew was seriously injured, but the outcome could 
have been very different with a full compliment of passengers due to the severe fire that caused 
$700,000 in damages. The NTSB concluded that the fire’s initial fuel source was a fractured diesel 
fuel line running to the starboard engine’s number five cylinder. The board also concluded that 
the fracture resulted from metal fatigue caused by excessive vibration, because the line was not 
properly secured (National Transportation Safety Board 2006b, ii). The severity of the fire prevented 
identification of the ignition source, but investigators reasoned that when the fuel contacted nearby 
hot engine components, a fire erupted. One of the most prevalent indications of an impending 
problem to everyone involved with the Express	Shuttle	II should have been the excessive number 
of replacement fuel lines required. The vessel had replaced 13 fuel lines on the starboard engine on 
11 different dates over a 10-month period. A warning in the engine manufacturer’s service manual 
specifically addressed the risk of fire from vibrating fuel lines. The root cause of the accident was 
improper preventive maintenance that should have identified both the incorrect fuel line fastening 
and the excessive replacement rate (National Transportation Safety Board 2006b, 41).
Engine Fire on Small Passenger Vessel Massachusetts
The second accident occurred two years later, in 2006, and also involved a fire that was caused 
from incorrect maintenance practices on an engine fuel line. The commuter ferry Massachusetts 
was underway in Boston Harbor carrying 69 passengers and crew when fire broke out in the engine 
room. The crew did an outstanding job of containing the fire, contacting local emergency responders 
and evacuating all passengers to a nearby ferry vessel. As a result of their actions, no one was 
injured, and the damage was limited to the Massachusetts’ engine room at an estimated cost of 
$800,000 (National Transportation Safety Board 2007a, 2). 
On the day of the fire, the Massachusetts had made three uneventful ferry runs during the 
morning and then traveled to a marine repair facility because of three mechanical problems. One 
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of these problems involved a faulty fuel injector, and while servicing the injector, the mechanic 
removed and replaced the fuel supply line of the number three cylinder. However, the mechanic 
did not calibrate or measure the amount of torque used in tightening the fuel line, even though he 
understood the importance of proper fastening. After repairs, the ferry began its afternoon passenger 
schedule and fire broke out in the engine room (National Transportation Safety Board 2007a, 22).
Investigators examining the wreckage concluded that the fuel line attached to the fuel injector 
of the number three cylinder had disconnected, allowing fuel to spray onto nearby hot engine 
components and ignite. The NTSB investigation of the Express	Shuttle	II and the Massachusetts 
noted deficiencies with the fire detection and extinguishing systems on both vessels. These two 
very similar accidents occurred two years apart but shared common human factors maintenance 
issues that involved improper practices and procedures on a specific engine component. Previously 
reported near-miss incidents could have allowed a reporting system to alert the maritime community 
(specifically maintenance personnel) of these hazards, possibly eliminating both accidents. In 
addition, the identification of inadequate fire fighting systems on both vessels might aid in identifying 
similar deficiencies on other vessels.
Capsizing of Small Passenger Vessel Lady D
The next two accidents involve stability issues, which caused both vessels to capsize and resulted 
in numerous fatalities. The first accident occurred in March 2004 and involved the small passenger 
vessel Lady	D, a pontoon water taxi, which was carrying 25 passengers and crew from Fort McHenry 
to Fells Point, Maryland. The vessel encountered heavy weather, began to roll in the waves and 
eventually capsized, drowning five and injuring 16. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) and 
NTSB determined that a faulty classification of the Lady	D had allowed the vessel to be certified 
for more passengers than its stability permitted. Specifically, the Lady	D had been certified under 
sister ship requirements used for four other vessels of similar dimensions, but different hull and 
superstructure designs. In addition, a passenger weight of 140 pounds was used as the standard for 
the original stability calculations, but did not accurately reflect the actual 168-pound average weight 
of the passengers on board the accident vessel (National Transportation Safety Board 2006a, ii). 
Capsizing of Small Passenger Vessel Ethan Allen
A similar fatal accident occurred a year and half later in October 2005 on Lake George, New York. 
A public vessel named the Ethan	Allen, carrying a state certificate of inspection, encountered waves 
from the wakes of nearby vessels and capsized. Twenty passengers died and nine were injured due to 
the insufficient stability of the vessel. The vessel had originally been certified by the USCG to carry 
48 passengers and two crewmembers, but the vessel had been sold and subsequent modifications 
completed under New York state regulations. As in the previous incident, the Ethan	Allen had used 
the sister ship certification process, even though the subsequent modifications differed from the 
original design (National Transportation Safety Board 2006c, ii).
Post accident stability tests indicated that the canopy and window modifications made to the 
Ethan	Allen should have voided its sister ship certification and required new stability calculations 
that would have reduced its passenger capacity from 48 to 14. A maritime reporting system may have 
generated earlier warnings about the hazards associated with the sister ship certification process. 
As in the case of the Lady	D, the average passenger weight on board the Ethan	Allen the day of 
the accident was 178 pounds, versus the 140-pound historical standard used to calculate stability 
(National Transportation Safety Board 2006c, 34). Inaccurate weight and balance issues have also 
been an increasing problem for airline safety, as identified by ASRS. The current average passenger 
weight exceeds the 170 pounds used to calculate performance and stability. Recognizing cross-
modal transportation safety issues, such as inaccurate maritime and aviation passenger weights, 
would be an additional benefit of an overarching transportation safety reporting system.
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Heeling Incident on the Cruise Ship Crown Princess
The following four accidents feature distinct occurrences that possibly could have been eliminated 
had similar incidents been used to alert and educate the maritime industry. During a July 2006 transit, 
the cruise ship Crown	Princess heeled over 24°, causing 298 passenger injuries but no structural 
damage. The event occurred when the second officer became concerned about the ship’s integrated 
navigation system and tried to counteract the system’s rudder inputs by switching from automatic to 
manual steering control (National Transportation Safety Board 2008, iv). 
Subsequent investigation revealed that the ship’s navigational autopilot performed as designed, 
but insufficient crew knowledge about the advanced system allowed a dangerous situation to 
develop. When the second officer interceded, his inappropriate actions caused several rudder 
reversals, which resulted in the vessel heeling over and tossing passengers and cargo about the 
cruise ship. The NTSB recommended additional crew training on the integrated navigation system 
and promotion of industry-wide reporting for other heeling incidents in order to gather information 
(National Transportation Safety Board 2008, 43).
A review of the ship’s recorded engineering data and performance indicated a fully operational 
autopilot system. Therefore, the key to understanding why the accident occurred required an 
examination into how the second officer interacted with the ship’s internal navigation system. While 
mechanical and electronic recorders tell what happened, an incident reporting system provides 
the why. Incident information is invaluable in educating others to identify and respond properly 
during similar situations. As the human-computer interface in both aircraft and vessels increases in 
complexity, it becomes even more important to understand human perceptions in the occurrence of 
near-miss incidents. Using this knowledge, appropriate actions can be devised and applied to clarify 
and correct operational human-computer interface issues before an accident occurs.
Boiler Explosion on SS Norway
A fatal accident occurred in the port of Miami in May 2003, when a boiler exploded on the SS 
Norway, killing eight and seriously injuring 10 of the ship’s crew. An hour after docking, a boiler 
in the aft boiler room exploded and sent 20 tons of water at 582°F expanding 1,200 times into a 
powerful wall of steam. The force of the explosion broke through a number of bulkheads and decks 
into the crew berthing areas and fatally injured several crew members. The NTSB concluded that 
faulty inspection procedures and boiler maintenance led to the explosion. In particular, improper 
water chemistry, boiler usage and cycle procedures caused the explosion (National Transportation 
Safety Board 2007c, 2-8). As in the previous accident, awareness and education are essential to 
preventing similar accidents. In the case of the SS	Norway, education concerning water chemistry 
and usage rotations discovered by other maritime companies could have educated this ship’s crew 
and possibly prevented the accident.
Pipeline Explosion Involving the Towing Vessel Miss Megan
A recent accident from 2006 might also have been averted by a reporting system that educated 
mariners on proper safety procedures. The Miss	Megan	was pushing two barges in the West Cote 
Blanche Bay oil field in Louisiana when the barge Athena	106 had its aft 5-ton spud (mooring pylon) 
accidently release into the water. The pylon struck an underwater gas pipeline that exploded resulting 
in the death of six workers and approximately $1.5 million in damages (National Transportation 
Safety Board 2007b, 4). 
The accident occurred because the barge and tug crews failed to follow all available safety 
precautions by not ensuring that the pylon winch brake was set or that the pylon holding pins 
had been secured during transit. Finding number eight of the NTSB report called for improved 
communication between the Coast Guard, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
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(OSHA) and the maritime industry (National Transportation Safety Board 2007b, 42). Providing 
feedback and improving communication in the aviation industry was the original purpose of ASRS, 
and a maritime reporting system would likewise serve as a valuable communication conduit for the 
maritime industry.
Bridge Collision with Towboat MAUVILLA
One of the deadliest U.S. maritime and rail accidents occurred in September 1993, when the 
tugboat MAUVILLA, pushing barges in Big Bayou, near Mobile, Alabama, struck and displaced a 
railroad bridge in dense fog. The resulting damage caused Amtrak’s Sunset Limited, traveling from 
Miami to Los Angeles, to derail, killing 47 and injuring 103 passengers and crew. The resulting 
NTSB investigation recommended that there be a system used to evaluate and report on bridges 
with similar risks (National Transportation Safety Board 1994). A maritime reporting system may 
have identified both the bridge at risk and the lack of navigational markings and radar reflectors 
encountered by the disoriented tugboat captain. An overarching cross-modal transportation incident 
reporting system would have the ability to identify hazards impacting multiple transportation modes 
prior to an accident.
As mentioned, the United States is a forerunner in the development and utilization of aviation 
safety tools but has not fully realized their relevance in the maritime industry. ASRS has inspired the 
development of similar aviation reporting programs in the 12 countries that form the International 
Confidential Aviation Safety Systems (ICASS) group. One of the earliest members of ICASS was 
the United Kingdom, which instituted an aviation reporting system based on ASRS in 1982 and also 
realized its applications to the maritime industry (NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System 2008b). 
U.K.’S MARITIME REPORTING SYSTEM
In 2003, the U.K. created a maritime reporting system called the Confidential Hazardous Incident 
Reporting Program (CHIRP). Some of the maritime reports CHIRP has received identify similar 
issues described in the previous maritime accidents. Reported information is distributed through 
CHIRP’s MARITIME	FEEDBACK newsletter in order to inform and educate the U.K.’s maritime 
community and prevent future accidents. As many British officers serve on non-U.K. flagships, and 
non-British seafarers serve on ships managed by British companies, CHIRP has become known 
internationally. Examples of topics typically covered in FEEDBACK include ineffective operating 
procedures, navigational issues and mechanical failures (Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting 
Program 2008b). 
CHIRP is managed as a charitable organization by an independent board of trustees, who help 
to ensure its autonomy through independent organization and financing. The program is funded 
by the U.K.’s Department of Transport (Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting Program 
2008b). Submissions to CHIRP are de-identified, and, with the consent of the reporter, are sent 
to organizations capable of addressing the reported situation or incident. Typically, anonymous 
reports are not acted upon unless the submitted information can be verified. Both the U.K.’s aviation 
and maritime reporting programs are designed to be complementary to other governmental and 
organizational reporting systems (Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting Program 2008a).
A list of written questions was submitted to the Director of Maritime CHIRP, Mr. Chris Rowsell, 
whose response was received on December 19, 2008, and was used in the following paragraphs. 
CHIRP offers mariners several reporting methods that include written reports, faxes, emails, 
telephone messaging and website submissions. The two most common submission methods used by 
mariners at sea are the CHIRP website or e-mail, and during five and a half years of operations, the 
maritime reporting system has received approximately 525 report submissions. Although CHIRP 
was designed for use by U.K. mariners, the program accepts reports from non-U.K. mariners, and 
if possible will present safety concerns to the owner or, where relevant, the insurer or the Flag 
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State. CHIRP has a robust and well-proven protocol for protecting the identity of its reporters, and 
these methods are strictly adhered to when coordinating reporter consent and follow up action. 
Incident information is disseminated to the relevant agency for information/action after removing 
identifying reporter information, and after a report is closed, CHIRP expunges the reporter’s contact 
information. 
Issues regarding reporter legal protections do not typically arise because CHIRP reports 
usually reference near-misses, which are unlikely to result in legal action since injury or damage 
did not occur. Accidents on U.K.-flag vessels and on ships in U.K. waters must be reported to 
the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB). The reports of the MAIB are inadmissible in 
judicial proceedings used to attribute or apportion liability or blame. If CHIRP receives a report of 
an accident that should have been reported to the MAIB, CHIRP advises the reporter accordingly. 
In the U.K., Certificates of Competency for mariners are issued by the Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency (MCA), an agency that encourages near-miss reporting and provides non-financial support 
to CHIRP. (The MCA’s Chief Executive is an ex-officio trustee of CHIRP and a member of the 
CHIRP Maritime Advisory Board). The nature of the hazardous incidents and near-misses being 
reported to CHIRP are not generally such that, if reported to the MCA, they would lead to revocation 
or suspension of a mariner’s certificate. Furthermore, CHIRP coordinates with each reporter about 
how the report is processed, so the possibility of self-incrimination is very low. In response to 
questions involving maritime security, Mr. Rowsell responded that CHIRP is not designed, nor does 
it actively seek security information. During the previous two years, CHIRP has dealt with only one 
report that described an alleged port security breach. Concerning the use of information received by 
CHIRP, Mr. Rowsell provided the following response:
a) For resolution of a specific safety issue with the employer. CHIRP uses the report 
to follow up with the employer or authorities, being careful not to disclose the 
identity of the reporter explicitly or implicitly.
b) For follow-up of a hazardous incident involving a third party, typically a near-
collision between two vessels. CHIRP typically provides the third party with a 
summary of the report, without identifying the reporter, and encourages the third 
party to investigate and to provide feedback.
c) To share concerns and lessons learned with the wider maritime community. CHIRP 
publishes a quarterly newsletter, Feedback, summarizing reports and commenting 
on them. Approximately 140,000 copies of this newsletter are distributed to the 
commercial shipping, leisure and fishing sectors of the maritime community and 
it is also published on the CHIRP website.
CHIRP’s primary means for promulgating the lessons learned is the quarterly newsletter 
described above. In addition, the CHIRP Maritime Director promotes the program through conference 
and seminar presentations and with regular visits to shipping companies, harbor masters, yacht 
clubs and other maritime industries. CHIRP is well represented in the maritime community, and 
its Maritime Advisory Board meets quarterly and includes senior representatives from 18 different 
maritime organizations. CHIRP monitors developments at the International Maritime Organization 
and International Labor Organization and conducts outreach efforts with international shipping 
companies, maritime organizations and international oil companies.
U.S. PROTOTYPE MARITIME SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM
The U.S. attempted to develop a maritime reporting program called the International Maritime 
Information Safety System (IMISS), but challenges detailed in the following paragraphs prevented 
implementation. A 1998 press release from the USCG and the U.S. Maritime Administration 
(MARAD) stated that a memorandum of agreement had been signed between the two agencies “to 
work together with industry to develop and implement a practical, voluntary, confidential national 
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maritime safety incident reporting system. The system would allow both agencies to receive, 
analyze, and disseminate information about unsafe occurrences” (United States Coast Guard 1998).
The USCG realized that near-miss incidents are an under-used source of human factors 
information and can be used proactively to prevent accidents, instead of reacting to the aftermath 
(United States Coast Guard 1998). The goals for the reporting program listed by the two agencies 
were “to reduce the frequency of marine casualties, the extent of injuries and property damage 
including environmental damage, and to create a safer and more efficient shipping transportation 
system and mariner work environment” (United States Coast Guard 1998). IMISS was also to 
“collect information on near-miss incidents, potential hazards, safety ‘best practices,’ and ‘lessons 
learned’ reported by members of the maritime industry” (United States Coast Guard Research & 
Development Center 1999). The two agencies invited industry participation in a working group 
that was created to design and develop the reporting system, because both agencies realized the 
necessity of industry participation and support in order to develop effective data collection, analysis 
and dissemination methods (United States Coast Guard 1998).
IMISS Report Form Development
Two of the working group’s members included NASA’s ASRS at Ames Research Center and the 
Coast Guard Research and Development Center. Collaboration between the two agencies developed 
a reporting form for prototype testing. The report form was developed for mariners, dockworkers, 
shipyard personnel, recreational boaters and others to report maritime incidents, hazards and near-
misses. The prototype system was evaluated to determine additional changes that would be required 
in an operational reporting system (United States Coast Guard Research & Development Center 
1999). 
The prototype used 87 mariners to test the IMISS report form for a simulated marine incident. 
The 87 who participated with the report form prototype were commercial mariners currently 
enrolled at one of three maritime training institutes. This group of reporters included 24 licensed 
deck personnel, 21 unlicensed deck personnel, 24 licensed engine personnel and 18 unlicensed 
engine personnel. Overall, these mariners were highly experienced, with 57 of the 87 reporters 
(66%) having 10 or more years of experience as commercial mariners. Approximately half of these 
mariners read a fictitious incident scenario and then completed a report, while the other half made 
up an incident and described it on the IMISS Report Form (United States Coast Guard Research & 
Development Center 1999).
The report forms were then reviewed and coded by two groups of analysts, human factors 
analysts and marine analysts. The analysts completed a report comment form for each report that 
evaluated how thoroughly and accurately each mariner reporter described the incident. At the 
conclusion of the evaluation, each analyst completed a survey that provided an overall assessment 
of the usability and validity of the report form and database. Each marine analyst reviewed and 
coded a subset of the reports, consulting with other analysts only as needed. Marine analysts also 
participated in regular conference calls with the human factors analysts to review major events and 
causes identified in the reports (United States Coast Guard Research & Development Center 1999).
Challenges to IMISS
A telephone interview was conducted concerning IMISS with USCG Captain Scott Ferguson, 
currently the District 7 Prevention Chief on December 16, 2008. He had previously served as the 
USCG Marine Safety Program Analyst for IMISS from 1997 to 2000 and was able to provide insight 
into the many challenges described in the following paragraphs. 
One obstacle for IMISS users involved the submission of reports from mariners underway or 
located in international ports. Unlike mariners, the majority of aviation pilots using ASRS are able 
to ensure their privacy by mailing reports or sending reports through secure electronic transmission, 
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without expending significant effort. Mariners face unique challenges by being isolated and away 
from the average amenities and services available to other transportation industry workers. Originally, 
IMISS had planned to use paper reporting forms submitted through the mail, but Captain Ferguson 
indicated that electronic reporting methods would have been adopted when secure transmission 
protocols permitted. 
In addition, the maritime industry’s workforce is even more diverse than that in aviation. 
Education levels range from professionally educated mariners to illiterate deck hands and cabin 
stewards, as well as the multi-national crews used by many companies, resulting in a mixture of 
cultures and languages. All of these challenges needed to be met with the development of a suitable 
reporting form and delivery protocol. When asked about the wide diversity of mariners using a single 
applicable reporting form, Captain Ferguson stated that the form’s simplicity worked, because the 
reviewing expert analysts had the ability to contact a reporter for amplifying information.
The greatest challenge to any voluntary reporting system is the ability to protect the reporter’s 
identity and encourage the open and continued flow of information. For the U.S. maritime industry, 
this difficulty is amplified by the limited number of U.S. vessels that typically operate in distinct 
geographic areas or on specific routes. This paradigm is contrary to aviation, where thousands of 
similar aircraft operate universally around the world, thereby helping to ensure the anonymity of 
aviation reporters. This challenge also requires regulating and enforcement agencies to have an 
enlightened attitude concerning the protection of reporter confidentiality and a desire to nurture a 
positive rapport between the industry, reporters and government. 
Captain Ferguson stated that IMISS did not receive this type of positive response during its 
development from the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Transportation Department, under which 
the Coast Guard served until 2003, required several executive departments to agree to the IMISS 
program provisions. The DOJ was the only agency that did not agree to reporter confidentiality and 
transactional immunity (non-punitive action) for reported incidents. The DOJ found it unreasonable 
to provide protection from civil fines and certificate action for inadvertent incidents. Understanding 
the important concepts surrounding transactional immunity can be difficult for an enforcement 
agency to embrace, but it is essential if improvement is to be made in discovering and reducing 
inadvertent human errors. It may be erroneous and shortsighted to believe that inadvertent human 
error can be legislated, regulated or forced into compliance through civil or criminal judicial action.
Due to DOJ objections, the development of IMISS stalled and the Coast Guard eventually 
withdrew funding, even though the Department of Defense endorsed IMISS and hoped to use it 
for its civilian reserve maritime fleet. Captain Ferguson stated there had been strong industry and 
international support for U.S. development of the reporting system, and efforts had even begun 
to incorporate confidential reporting systems such as IMISS into the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). He stated that a number of prominent U.S. maritime companies planned to 
use IMISS to establish internal company safety reporting systems. Captain Ferguson stated that 
maritime companies with superior safety programs understood the importance and value of learning 
from occurrences outside their company fleets. 
A written interview was conducted with Mr. Alex Landsburg, the former MARAD representative 
to IMISS, on December 23, 2008. He is currently a senior advisory staff member for Computer 
Sciences Corporation. Independent from Captain Ferguson, Mr. Landsburg expressed a similar 
viewpoint regarding the necessity for IMISS and the culpability of the DOJ in its failure. He 
indicated that many preeminent maritime companies remain strongly supportive of developing a 
safety reporting system, even without the protection of transactional immunity. 
Mr. Landsburg described MARAD’s current efforts to develop the Ship Operations Cooperative 
Program, an IMISS type system for its members. He also recognized the strong NTSB support for 
the near-miss reporting concept and its applications in other transportation domains, such as a newly 
implemented reporting system at the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). Although numerous 
significant challenges confronted IMISS, it is unfortunate that the program was not allowed to 
develop and prove its value in improving maritime safety.
Reporting System Paradigm
111
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY REPORTING
The consequences of the terrorist attacks in 2001 have also required security to be included in any 
discussion of transportation safety. The requirements of the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
(MTSA) have increased the importance of information flow throughout the maritime sector. While 
IMISS had been developed before 2001, Captain Ferguson felt that security would be a logical 
extension for IMISS and that such a venue for generalized threat identification would be extremely 
valuable.
This author was part of a NASA team at ASRS that developed and implemented the Security 
Incident Reporting System (SIRS) for use in the aviation sector. SIRS was designed specifically 
to target security and provide a reporting avenue for security incidents and issues that were being 
reported through the ASRS. In addition, it was designed primarily for the thousands of new 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees, who instantly became the first line 
of defense in commercial aviation. A prototype of SIRS was put in place at three large northern 
California airports and was gaining momentum until NASA redirected funding for all of the agency’s 
aviation security work toward space exploration. The concept of adding security reporting to IMISS 
was discussed during the creation of SIRS, and members of the SIRS working group believed that 
maintaining a single reporting system for both safety and security would be very effective.
Security would be a logical addition to IMISS and would enhance the value of the program by 
adding additional capabilities. Protocols for the handling of maritime security sensitive information 
(SSI) would need to be developed, as was done for the aviation sector. The role of IMISS would 
remain a complementary system, and its purpose would be to identify general security hazards and 
trends, rather than time-critical threats. IMISS would serve as a relief valve for those individuals 
reluctant to use other reporting channels. Like safety, the reported security incident information 
could be assessed for threats and used as appropriate for education throughout the maritime industry. 
In addition, the interdependence of cargo transportation modes would increase the effectiveness of 
a security incident reporting system that operated across the boundaries of rail, maritime, aviation 
and highway.
CONCLUSIONS
The effort and support for the prevention of accidents and improvement of security is especially 
prominent in critical outcome environments, where even a minor mistake can have tragic results. 
The losses of life and substantial injury that may result from inadvertent accidents or deliberate 
actions are especially tragic if it is later discovered that the event could have been prevented. 
In large, complex and dynamic environments like transportation, nuclear power, medicine and 
security, even a minor error or system flaw can lead to catastrophe. Every opportunity to discover 
and learn from previous incidents must be encouraged and maximized. In order to enhance safety 
and improve security throughout the U.S., it is paramount that the nation develops capabilities to 
study the synergistic relationships between transportation modes in order to effectively apply the 
lessons learned from near-miss incidents. In order to protect our nation’s valuable, but vulnerable 
maritime infrastructure, now is the time for the U.S. to develop and incorporate a reporting system 
for the commercial maritime industry.
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